Lobbying the Regulatory State: An Examination of Regulation and Revolving Door Lobbying by Lowrance, Charles, III
James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal
Volume 6 | Issue 1
2018-2019
Lobbying the Regulatory State: 
An Examination of Regulation 
and Revolving Door Lobbying 
Follow this and other works at: http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/jmurj
Recommended APA Citation
Lowrance, C., III. (2019). Lobbying the regulatory state: An examination of regulation and revolving door 
lobbying. James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal, 6(1), 51-60. Retrieved from http://commons.lib.jmu.
edu/jmurj/vol6/iss1/5
This full issue is brought to you for free and open access by JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Charles Lowrance III
James Madison University 
James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal 51
ABSTRACT
The prominence of lobbying activity in Washington, D.C., is well-known and often discussed by pundits 
and legislators alike. For those familiar with the practice of lobbying, it is not a secret that many former 
government employees become lobbyists and vice versa in a phenomenon often called the revolving door. Yet 
to be determined, however, is what leads to these so-called revolving door lobbyists and what factors contribute 
to a heightened number of them working on similar issues.
This study sought to determine if there is a relationship between the degree to which the federal government 
regulates a certain industry and the number of revolving door lobbyists representing the interests of that 
industry. This was accomplished by first determining a means of categorizing sectors of the economy and then 
assessing the federal regulatory burden placed upon each sector and the number of lobbyists active in each 
sector. Correlational analysis was then conducted to determine any relationship between the federal regulatory 
burden and the number of lobbyists. Results suggest a positive relationship between the federal regulatory 
burden and number of lobbyists—if there are more regulations, there will be more lobbyists. The analysis also 
allowed for the construction of a predictive model that can be used to determine the likely number of revolving 
door lobbyists active in a sector of the economy given a certain number of regulations relevant to the sector. 
LOBBYING THE REGULATORY STATE: 
AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATION 
AND REVOLVING DOOR LOBBYING
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One of the greatest threats to a democracy is the erosion 
of its institutions from the inside out and, thus, the 
eradication of public trust in them. Revolving door 
lobbying, or at least the public’s perception of it, is the 
prime example of this threat. I consider existing literature 
to determine the causes and nature of this phenomenon 
by which individuals move between working for the 
government and working in government affairs roles and 
conduct my own research on the explanatory and predictive 
capabilities of one potential cause.
After compiling data on individual lobbyists, their previous 
employment, and their clients, as well as data on the state 
of federal regulation, I conducted a quantitative analysis 
to examine the relationship between these variables. I ran 
regression analyses to determine the correlation between 
the test variables and use a marginal predicted values test to 
evaluate the model’s predictive and explanatory capabilities. 
The results of these tests suggest that the higher the 
regulatory burden on an industry and the greater number 
of words making up those regulations, the more revolving 
door lobbyists there will be advocating on behalf of 
that industry.
Literature Review 
Throughout the history of the United States, and particularly 
since the advent of statutory mandates for lobbying 
disclosure in 1995, the total amount spent on lobbying has 
grown. Since 1998, that amount has risen 217% from $1.45 
billion annually to $3.16 billion annually in 2016 (The 
Center for Responsive Politics, 2019). One of the benefits of 
this requirement is the ability to study the revolving door—the 
phenomenon where those with government jobs on their 
résumés enter the business of influencing government—and 
how it affects policy making in Washington. The challenges 
of identifying revolving door lobbyists, hereafter referred to 
as revolvers, are due to definitional loopholes and the onus of 
responsibility falling upon the lobbyists themselves. Despite 
the vast existing literature on revolving door lobbying, the 
question of whether or not—and, if so, why—revolvers are 
more prevalent in some industries is still unanswered.
Why Interests Lobby
One of the main problems that interest groups face is 
the constant fluctuation in political priorities (LaPira & 
Thomas, 2017). The vast majority never receive attention. 
This inability to gain traction can be frustrating, especially 
for groups whose goals and interests are relatively 
inconsequential for the country as a whole (Baumgartner, 
Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009).
Lobbyists aid clients in overcoming this hurdle by knowing 
when the political tides are turning. A skilled lobbyist 
with a keen sense of strategy will know the best time to 
push for a preferred policy and when to shift to a more 
defensive strategy (Kingdon, 1984). While this is likely 
the image that comes to mind for most people when they 
think of lobbyists, lobbyists also play an entirely different 
and equally important role in service of their clients. 
Many interest groups will retain lobbyists to monitor the 
workings of government, to report back on the state of law 
and regulation pertaining to their industry, and to provide 
expertise on a given policy area. For example, a parcel 
delivery service might retain a team of lobbyists to monitor 
the House Transportation Committee.
Some lobbyists only keep clients apprised of policy changes 
that may be implemented, while others also serve as de 
facto staff for the relevant Congressional committee(s). 
This opportunity to supply members of Congress 
with specialized information is relatively new. A 
decline in committee staff and nonpartisan bureaucratic 
analysts beginning in the 1970s has created a gap in 
Congress’s information-gathering processes, affording 
lobbyists access to the very minds they hope to sway 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2015).
The lobbying industry is one of influence and insurance. 
Lobbyists with valuable process knowledge and a keen 
sense of strategy play a monitoring role and tend to work 
the offensive, whereas lobbyists with policy expertise 
take up the defensive and provide political insurance for 
their clients by providing Congress with information it 
needs while casting that information in a light favorable 
to their clients’ interests (LaPira & Thomas, 2017). The 
determination that interest groups must perform when 
hiring lobbyists is how to balance the two, a process that 
depends upon the regulatory climates surrounding their 
area of interest or industry.
Government Activity and Interest Group 
Mobilization
Given that it is the goal of interest groups to affect policy 
and the actions of government broadly, it seems logical that 
this interest group activity causes government activity. A 
study on the correlation of the growth of government and 
the growth of interest groups suggests that the activity of 
government actually serves as the demand-force (Leech, 
Baumgartner, LaPira, & Semanko, 2005). The researchers 
hypothesized that interest group mobilization would occur 
when two factors intersect: an opinion or need on the part of 
an interest group or a group capable of mobilizing resources 
to influence policy and the possibility of government action. 
This second factor led them to believe that interest groups 
with desires far outside of the current focus of government 
either do not exist or have a very low rate of success. They 
noted that the necessity of the possibility of government 
action is at the core of the definition of “interest” that 
Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury (1997) established 
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in their study of Washington lobbying titled The Hollow Core: 
Private Interests in National Policy Making:
It is at the intersection of public policy and the wants 
and values of private actors that we discover interests. 
What we call the interests of the groups are not 
simply valued conditions or goals, such as material 
riches, moral well-being, or symbolic satisfaction. 
It is only as these are affected, potentially or in 
fact, by public policy, by the actions of authoritative 
public officials, that the valued ends are transformed 
into political interests that can be sought or opposed 
by interest groups. (p. 24)
To test their hypothesis, Leech et al. (2005) compiled data 
from over 45,000 lobby registration reports from 1996 to 
2000 and measures of government activity from the Policy 
Agendas Project and examined at the issue area level 
the relationship between the frequency of congressional 
hearings and the number of firms active. The findings 
suggest that lobbying activity follows the government and 
that it is only after the government turns its attention to 
a specific issue area that interest group activity relating to 
that area begins to increase notably.
The Value of the Revolving Door
Because a legal requirement that lobbying activities be 
disclosed was only enacted in the mid 1990s, it has only 
recently been, established whether a trip through the 
revolving door benefits a lobbyist in terms of skill market-
ability or greater ability to generate revenue. Using reports 
filed by 637 contract lobbyists in accordance with the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), LaPira and Thomas 
(2017) examined the differences in annual revenue between 
conventional and revolving door lobbyists. Unsurprisingly, 
their findings showed significantly greater mean and 
median level revenue (measured by examining publicly-
accessible LDA disclosure forms) among the revolvers 
(2.2:1 mean ratio and 3.3:1 median ratio, revolving door 
lobbyist revenue to conventional lobbyist revenue). With a 
difference of $181,075 in the mean revenue and a difference 
of $156,760 in the median revenue, there is strong evidence 
that previous government employment results in a higher 
degree of annual revenue.
LaPira and Thomas (2017) also looked into the differences 
in revenue among revolvers depending upon what position 
in government they had previously served in. For example, 
a former congressional staffer generated a median amount 
of $307,500 a year in revenue, whereas a lobbyist without 
previous congressional employment generated a median 
amount of $70,000 a year in revenue. Former congressional 
staffers earned $4.40 for every $1 earned by lobbyists with 
no previous congressional employment. While rare, former 
members of Congress (only 10 of the 637 lobbyists making 
up the sample population fit this description) generated 
the greatest amount of annual revenue. At the median, 
members-turned-lobbyists generated $454,120 in a year—
roughly 648% of the median revenue generated by lobbyists 
without previous congressional employment (LaPira & 
Thomas, 2017).
While the data and findings do not necessarily reflect 
the compensation of lobbyists, LaPira and Thomas (2017) 
operate on the general assumption that lobbyists’ reported 
revenue is a reliable indicator of their compensation as 
lobbyists. Given this assumption, the findings can lead to 
the conclusion that passing through the revolving door 
increases the salary of someone with previous government 
employment, which is an indicator that interest groups find 
their unique background particularly valuable.
Explaining the Phenomenon
There are two schools of thought for explaining why 
revolvers are more effective and therefore more highly 
valued than conventional lobbyists. The first school believes 
that revolvers are more highly valued due to the connection-
dependent nature of Washington and the advantage 
gained from having a network of individuals inside the 
policymaking establishment. The second school—the one 
most often subscribed to by lobbyists—believes that prior 
government service provides an individual with  greater 
process-related knowledge. Having already worked within 
the policymaking apparatus either as a member or a staffer, 
this individual will have a deeper understanding of the 
nuance and underlying norms of procedure that govern the 
operations on Capitol Hill (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-
Rosen, 2012).
Differential Efficacy of the Revolving Door
Despite data showing that revolvers have a measurable 
amount of particular process knowledge and a significant 
degree of professional socialization (Salisbury, Johnson, 
Heinz, Laumann, & Nelson, 1989), these factors do not 
necessarily translate to tangible successes when it comes to 
specific legislative goals. The fact that revolvers generate 
significantly more revenue and are therefore more highly 
valued than conventional lobbyists (LaPira & Thomas, 
2017) does not answer the question, “Are revolving door 
lobbyists more effective than conventional lobbyists?”
A Different Point of View
In considering the causes behind the disproportionately 
higher value placed upon those who have passed through the 
revolving door by firms and clients, it only seems rational to 
consult with the lobbyists themselves. They represent their 
clients’ interests and, as such, have particularly privileged 
insight into how they carry out this project and what, if 
anything, from their previous employment makes them 
especially adept at doing so.
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An analysis of 776 interest representatives and subsequent 
interviews that they sat for between 1983 and 1984 revealed 
how lobbyists feel about their experience in government 
(Salisbury et al., 1989). Some 80% stated that their previous 
employment in government provided an increased degree 
of familiarity with the decision-making process, while 70% 
said that it provided them familiarity with issues pertaining 
to their contracts. Of those who had worked in the executive 
branch only, 53% said that their previous employment 
provided them with contacts within the administration. On 
the other hand, of those who had worked in Congress only, 
a staggering 87% reported that their previous employment 
provided them with contacts within Congress (Salisbury et 
al., 1989).
The findings of Salisbury et al. (1989) suggest that lobbyists 
place a very high value on their previous government 
employment. Their testimonies support the second school 
of thought in that they attribute the disproportionately 
higher value of revolvers to their knowledge of the process. 
Upon disaggregation, Salisbury et al.’s findings also support 
the first school of thought, although mostly only in the case 
of those who had previously served in Congress.
The Bureaucracy: A Second Revolving Door
While many revolvers come from Congress, notable 
interest group activity surrounds the executive branch as 
well. There was, however, almost no data on lobbying in 
administrative agencies up until 2013. This is likely due to 
the fact that the term “lobbying” typically elicits an image 
of interests conveying their wishes to individuals who will 
make a decision on policy at some point in the future and 
not to those who will be tasked with implementing said 
policy. Given that the administrative bureaucracy does 
not typically have this sort of authority (at least not to the 
degree that Congress does), the activity of interest groups in 
this branch of government went mostly overlooked until a 
2013 paper by Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty.
LDA reports from 1996 show that of 9,388 incidents of 
interest groups lobbying at the federal level, 3,817 occurred 
within the administrative agencies. Nearly 41% of lobbying 
occurred in the executive branch. In addition, 3,601 of the 
5,570 groups that lobbied the legislative branch also lobbied 
the executive branch, meaning that over 64% of interest 
groups that actively lobbied Congress also had lobbyists 
working somewhere within the administrative bureaucracy 
(Boehmke et al., 2013).
These findings suggest that interest groups are aware of 
the importance of being heard by policymakers as well 
as by policy implementers, and that they are actively 
mobilizing across governmental venues. In the context 
of revolving door lobbying, it also seems to suggest an 
entire submarket of former government officials that are 
marketable to lobbying firms and clients as having special 
knowledge of the political process and a high degree of 
professional socialization. Given the conclusion that 
previous government service typically results in higher 
levels of generated revenue (LaPira & Thomas, 2017) and 
that connections to individuals still inside government 
correlate with higher revenue (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012), 
it is not unlikely that former bureaucrats are similarly 
more highly valuable as professional lobbyists.
The Growth of Regulatory Burden
In light of the theory of lobbying as an insurance policy 
against the uncertainties of government (LaPira & 
Thomas, 2017), it follows that these uncertainties need to 
be quantified in a manner that is easy to understand and 
analyze. As a part of an ongoing project to measure the 
growth of the Federal Register (the official collection of 
the agency rules, proposed rules, and public notices of the 
federal government), scholars at the Mercatus Center have 
done just that (McLaughlin & Sherouse, 2017). Utilizing 
a text analysis algorithm that searches for keywords, they 
constructed a database of regulatory constraints in the 
Code of Federal Regulations (the actual codification of the 
rules and regulations of the federal agencies and executive 
departments) in a given year and the applicability of those 
constraints to various industries as categorized by the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
This project, known as RegData 3.1 in its current rendition, 
demonstrates the accumulation of regulatory restrictions 
over time. Between 1970 and 1981, restrictions were added at 
a rate of about 24,000 per year. This pace slowed only slightly 
over the next half decade before picking back up to 18,000 
restrictions per year from 1985 to 1995. A decrease of 27,000 
restrictions occurred from 1995 to 1996, which coincided 
with the Republican Revolution and the passage of many 
components of Speaker Gingrich’s Contract with America, 
which were intended to deregulate the U.S. economy. In the 
two decades since, the number of regulations identified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations has grown by about 13,000 
restrictions per year (McLaughlin & Sherouse, 2017). 
While the data only covers the past half-century due to 
the publication of yearly revisions to the entire code 
beginning in 1967 (McKinney, 2018), it does suggest that 
the general trend, irrespective of party control of Congress 
or the Presidency, is that the number of regulations on the 
books increases over time. As early as 1988, Shapiro and 
Glicksman observed that this trend is concurrent with the 
trend of increased legislative vagueness and the transfer of 
discretion to the administrative bureaucracies. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the 1970s saw the abolition or defunding of 
nonpartisan research agencies,the decline in congressional 
committee staff (Kramer, 2017), and the rise of revolving 
door lobbyists in Washington.
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While existing literature paints a general picture of the 
lobbying industry and provides insight into the role 
revolvers play, it does not address two fundamental 
questions regarding the demand for this special type 
of lobbyist. First the historical collection of literature 
does not include a focused, quantitative analysis of the 
revolving door phenomenon and how and why it might 
vary across different parts of the economy. Second, it has 
yet to be shown whether a relationship exists between the 
actual number of restrictive regulations relevant to an issue 
category (a level of classification for sections of the economy 
created by the Center for Responsive Politics) in the Code 
of Federal Regulations in a given year and the number 
of revolving door lobbyists representing clients classified 
within that category in the same year. The following 
sections analyze Lobbying Disclosure Act data compiled 
by the Center for Responsive Politics and the outputs of 
the RegData 3.1 algorithm from the Mercatus Center to 
determine if the data shows a positive relationship.
Theory and  
Hypotheses
The causal chain I propose is as follows: the destaffing of 
congressional committees and the erosion of nonpartisan 
research and analysis agencies led to increased vagueness 
in the language of legislation passed by Congress. This 
vagueness shifted responsibility to the executive branch 
where bureaucrats were tasked with interpreting the 
legislation, making determinations about what it actually 
prescribed, and filling in the gaps left by the legislature. 
This led to an increased tendency to go over and above the 
actual intended purpose of a piece of legislation. 
Bureaucrats typically spend their entire careers within their 
respective agencies, and become skilled at administering the 
various programs and policies of the federal government. 
They are accustomed to taking what is required of them 
by law and doing it. When they are given the opportunity 
and responsibility to interpret vague laws and to even fill 
in large gaps on their own, they will gravitate to over-
regulation. This does not mean that bureaucrats are sinister 
or advantage-seeking, nor does it mean that they are fearful 
of being reprimanded in some way if they do not act. Instead 
it is simply that their jobs make them prone to overestimate 
the ability of government and to get carried away with what 
might otherwise be seen as a vague, yet still constraining 
statute.
As a result of this overregulation, businesses have seen 
an increasingly more hostile and uncertain regulatory 
climate and have, in turn, adapted their lobbying strategies 
to deal with the uncertainty. These adaptations include, 
most notably, an increased demand for revolving door 
lobbyists who have the knowledge necessary to understand 
the political processes and who can keep their clients 
apprised of any upcoming changes to relevant regulatory 
frameworks. Additionally, lobbyists with policy experience 
were well-positioned to fill the information-gathering gap 
for Congress as they used their access to advocate for their 
clients (Baumgartner & Jones, 2015).
Existing literature suggests that it is the demand effect of 
the level of government activity rather than the supply effect 
of the number of active lobbying firms that determines the 
degree of interest group mobilization and the volume of 
lobbying activity relevant to the issue areas in which the 
government is active (Leech et al., 2005). While Leech et al. 
(2005) focused on congressional lobbying and the activity of 
the federal legislature (measured primarily by the number 
of congressional hearings), it illustrates a notable trend in 
the world of lobbying that I think can be observed when 
it comes to the regulatory activity of the executive branch 
and, more specifically, the professional bureaucracy.
From this causal explanation, I deduce the following 
hypotheses: If there is a greater number of regulations 
in the Code of Federal Regulations for a given industry 
category in a given year, then there will be a greater 
number of revolving door lobbyists with clients who are 
classified within that category in the same year. If there is a 
greater number of regulatory words in the Code of Federal 
Regulations relevant to a given industry category in a given 
year, then there will be a greater number of revolving door 
lobbyists with clients who are classified within that category 
in the same year.
Methodology
To test my hypotheses, I performed a cross-sectional 
observational study of federal lobbying disclosure data, data 
relating to the number of restrictive regulations at the federal 
level, and the number of regulatory words making up those 
regulations (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, 2014). Organizing 
the data by industry category (a subsection of the economy 
formulated by the Center for Responsive Politics) provided 
variation in the dependent variable, as the regulation data 
was organized and filtered by industry according to the 
North American Industry Classification Systems (NAICS). 
This pairing of lobbying and regulation data allowed me 
to investigate the variations in the frequency of revolvers 
with clients in a certain industry category and how these 
variations correlate with both variations in the number of 
restrictive federal regulations and variations in the number 
of regulatory words relating to the same industry category.
It should be noted that the incommensurable formats of 
the data sources necessitated a degree of cross-tabulation, 
which inevitably gave room for subjectivity. The lobbying 
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data sourced from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(2019) was organized by their proprietary, three-tiered 
organizational scheme. The regulation data sourced from 
the RegData project at the Mercatus Center was organized 
by the more modern and entirely different NAICS system. 
This incompatibility meant that I needed to perform a 
manual translation between the CRP system and the 
NAICS system so that the available regulation data could be 
paired with the appropriate categories according to CRP’s 
proprietary scheme. In carrying out this manual procedure, 
I utilized the NAICS database and the descriptions located 
on the United States Census Bureau’s website (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2017) and only committed to a 
translation if there was significant assuredness that the 
NAICS category being considered did, in fact, correspond 
to the CRP category being considered. While many 
acceptable matches were found, there were many instances 
where a match between the two categorization systems 
could not be found. There were also instances where the 
same NAICS code was paired to more than one CRP 
code, resulting in the need to select only one pairing for 
use in my analysis. In determining which duplicates to 
use, I considered the similarity of each category to other 
categories that already had a match made was considered. 
If one of the duplicate categories was notably similar to 
another category already matched, I omitted it and opted 
instead for the duplicate that was likely to increase the 
diversity of my sample.
Organizing the data by CRP category resulted in a data 
table with individual rows for each of the industry 
categories and individual columns containing four test 
variables: number of lobbyists with clients in said category 
in the observation year, number of revolving door lobbyists 
with clients in said category in the observation year, 
number of restrictive federal regulations pertaining 
to said category in the observation year, and number of 
relevant regulatory words pertaining to said category in 
the observation year.
Two pairwise correlation tests were performed to determine 
if a correlation existed between the number of revolving 
door lobbyists in each category and the two dependent 
variables (the number of restrictive regulations and the 
number of relevant regulatory words pertaining to each 
industry category). The output of this test included both 
a Pearson’s r-value and a probability value (p-value). 
The r-value summarized the magnitude of the linear 
relationship between the two pairs of variables, whereas 
the p-value indicated whether my predictor variables (the 
number of restrictive federal regulations and the number 
of relevant regulatory words) were useful in predicting the 
number of revolvers. If a predictor value was less than 0.05 
(p<0.05), there was no difference between the means of 
the variables, and it could be concluded that a significant 
difference existed and that the predictor variable was, in 
fact, useful in predicting the dependent variable. This 
would essentially result in the ability to assume the validity 
of the research hypothesis and to reject the counterclaim to 
it (the null hypothesis).
After determining that the null hypothesis could be rejected, 
two negative binomial regression analyses were conducted. 
Due to my data being count data, meaning that I was 
Zmerely counting my variables (number of revolving door 
lobbyists, restrictive regulations, and regulatory words), a 
standard linear regression would likely produce negative 
predicted values, which are theoretically impossible because 
there could not be a negative number of revolving door 
lobbyists. The output of these regression analyses provided 
a number of useful figures, such as the beta, which is a 
measure that can be used in determining the likelihood of 
a change in the dependent variable given a change in an 
independent variable.
The model has both explanatory and predictive capabilities, 
providing a quantified measure of the degree to which the 
two pairs of variables are correlated and an equation that 
can be used to predict the frequency of revolving door 
lobbyists with clients classified within a given industry 
category given the number of restrictive federal regulations 
or the number of relevant words contained within the Code 
of Federal Regulations.
Data and Discussion
After performing the cross-tabulation described above, 
the remaining sample size (n) was 98. This served as the 
number of observations used for the actual data analysis. I 
have included the table below, which includes descriptive 
statistics for each of the variables being used in this analysis.
I performed a pair-wise correlation test, resulting in a 
correlation table containing a number of Pearson r-values 
and indications of whether or not the two variables for 
which these r-values correspond are significantly different. 
The r-value for the frequency of revolvers and the number 
of restrictive regulations at the federal level in 2015 is 
0.2895. The p-value for these two variables is less than 
0.01, meaning that there is statistical significance between 
the two variables and that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected with 99% certainty. The r-value for the frequency 
of revolvers and the number of relevant words in the Code 
of Federal Regulations in 2015 is 0.2646. The p-value for 
these two variables is less than 0.01, meaning that there is 
statistical significance between the two variables and that 
the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% certainty.
Turning to the regression analyses, the pairing of the 
frequency of revolvers and the number of restrictive 
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regulations at the federal level in 2015 was considered. The 
negative binomial regression resulted in a beta of 0.0000137, 
a standard error of 0.000044, and a z -score of 3.08. I also 
looked at the pairing of the frequency of revolvers and 
the number of relevant words in the Code of Federal 
Regulations in 2015. The negative binomial regression for 
these variables resulted in a beta of 0.00000136, a standard 
error of 0.00000473, and a z -score of 2.87.
The betas from the two negative binomial regression tests 
are indicative of the slope of a regression line. They are 
more useful, however, in determining the likelihood that 
the frequency of revolvers will increase given a certain 
increase in the independent variable being considered. This 
predictive capability is visualized in Table 2 and Figure 1 
(for the number of regulations) and Table 3 and Figure 2 
(for the number of regulatory words).
In Table 2 and Figure 1, artificial reference points along the 
independent variable were created at increments of 25,000. 
Each of these increments has a corresponding marginal 
predictive value—the predicted number of revolving door 
lobbyists representing clients within a given industry 
category given the number of restrictive regulations 
being considered. For example, if there were 75,000 
restrictive federal regulations impacting the sugar beet 
farming industry, there would be, according to the model, 
approximately 135 revolving door lobbyists (134.5307) with 
clients categorized within the sugar beet farming industry 
according to CRP’s classification scheme.
The same has been done in regards to the number of 
regulatory words as the independent variable in Table 3 
and Figure 2. Due to the significantly greater values in this 
variable than in the preceding one, I made the increments 
greater, at every five million. As with the number of 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Frequency of 
Revolvers
98 60.09524 77.5397 1 579
Restrictive 
Regulations
98 18513.18 26172.31 228.9442 126883.4
Relevant 
Regulatory Words





Independent Variable Event 
(# of regulations)




































250 0 0 50 0 0 0 750 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 125 0 0 0
industry-relevant restrictions
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
Figure 1. Predictive Model (Regulations)
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regulations, each of these increments has a corresponding 
marginal predictive value—the predicted number of 
revolving door lobbyists representing clients within a given 
industry category given the number of regulatory words 
being considered. Continuing with the earlier example, 
if there were 15,000,000 regulatory words impacting the 
sugar beet farming industry, there would be, according 
to the model, approximately 377 revolving door lobbyists 
(376.8755e) with clients categorized within the sugar beet 
farming industry according to CRP’s classification scheme. 
Conclusion
Since lobbying data has become available over the past 
two decades, social scientists have been able to track the 
lobbying industry and identify trends within it that might 
be particularly impactful to our democracy. The trend that 
has probably garnered the most attention aside from the 
rapid growth in the amount spent on lobbying activities 
has been the prevalence and growth of the revolving door 
phenomenon.
The pundits in media and the public tend to ascribe 
the growth of this phenomenon to the corrupt nature of 
politicians or to the inescapable temptations of “the swamp.” 
In reality, however, the reason has more to do with the 
special knowledge and skills that government experience 
affords than institutional corruption or the oligarchical 
tendencies of elected officials. In the hopes of determining 
one of the reasons that the demand for these lobbyists with 
government experience is so high, I built upon the works 
of LaPira and Thomas (2017), among others, to examine 
the relationship between the growth of the so-called 
“regulatory state” and the revolving door. Literature suggests 
that the rise in revolving door lobbying has coincided with 
both the rise in the number of federal regulations and 
the increased vagueness of legislation stemming from the 
destaffing of key committees in Congress. It would seem, 
then, that the growth in regulation is at least partly a factor 
in explaining why the number of revolving door lobbyists 
continues to grow.
This argument was evaluated by examining subsectors of 
the economy and the prevalence of revolvers, regulations, 
and regulatory words in relation to them. Using CRP’s 
Lobbying Database and the regulation data made available 
by the Mercatus Center’s RegData project, I compiled a 
dataset that could be used for further analysis. Finally, I ran 
two separate negative binomial regressions—one between 
regulations and revolvers and one between regulatory words 
and revolvers—to investigate the relationships.
The regression analyses supported both my research 
hypotheses. In both regressions, I found a positive 
correlation between the variables being examined. The 
output data of each of these analyses also allowed for the 
construction of a predictive model that could be used to 
determine the likely number of revolving door lobbyists 
active in an industry category given a certain number of 
regulations or of regulatory words relevant to the category.
Despite the support for this hypothesis, the sample size was 
small. It could have been increased if there had been greater 
time and resources to conduct a more thorough cross-
tabulation between the CRP and the NAICS classification 
systems. Performing a more thorough examination of the 
CRP and NAICS categories would have allowed the ident-
ification of more pairings, which would have increased the 
number of CRP categories available to me when I searched 
the RegData files for regulation data and would have led to 
a larger number of observations included in the analyses.
My sample size was also constrained by the available 
regulation data in the RegData outputs. There were a 
number of instances where data on the volume of regulations 
corresponding to a certain NAICS code was not located. I 
cannot speak to the reason why such data was not included 
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Figure 2. Predictive Model (Relevant Words)
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it stems from a lack of sufficient data for the RegData 
algorithm to identify regulatory language that would 
correspond to those NAICS codes. 
Despite these shortcomings, the analyses produced results 
that can be utilized in further research on the revolving 
door phenomenon. In addition to dedicating more time and 
resources to completing a comprehensive cross-tabulation, 
future researchers might also consider adding a temporal 
element. This would allow for an examination of whether 
the relationship between the regulatory burden and the 
prevalence of revolving door lobbyists has existed in the 
past and, if it has, whether or not it has been strengthening, 
weakening, or remaining constant. A future researcher 
might also devise a way to assess each regulation for 
“burdensomeness” or how much money and time would 
need to be dedicated to complying with each regulation. 
This approach would allow for an analysis of the effects of 
not only the volume of regulations on the revolving door 
phenomenon, but also the effects of the felt weight of those 
regulations.
It should also be noted that the increased volume of 
regulations is certainly not the only factor contributing 
to the prevalence of revolving door lobbyists. The volume 
of regulations on a given industry certainly possesses 
explanatory capabilities, but it is only part of the explanation. 
Other likely factors include the mean market value of the 
business entities within each industry and the frequency 
of litigation undertaken by business entities within each 
industry. It is probable that an industry category containing 
businesses with more assets and businesses involved in 
more litigation will have a greater frequency of revolvers 
representing businesses in that category.
In sum, this research is useful in answering a fundamental 
question concerning the nature of our government, the 
way it implements policy, and the types of individuals who 
seek to influence it. An increase in the regulatory burden 
placed upon an industry does correlate with an increase in 
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